Measuring credit risk and capital adequacy according to the size and ownership structure of Iran's listed banks based on the generalized panel moments model (GMM).

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
Mohammad Roshan 1
Behrooz Khodarahmi 2
Fatemeh Sarraf 3
1 Department of Accounting, Kish International Branch, Islamic Azad University, Kish Island, Iran
2 Department of Economic Development Management Research, Management and Technology Development Studies Center, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
3 Faculty of Economics and Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Tehran South Branch
Abstract
This study measures the credit risk and capital adequacy according to the size and governance structure of the banks admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange. The data used in this research includes the financial data included in the audited financial statements of 22 banks admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange Organization, which were collected in a panel form and in the period of 2019-2019.
In order to investigate the impact of ownership concentration and ownership structure on the credit risk-taking behavior and capital adequacy of banks, the variables of shareholders with shares greater than one percent are used as ownership concentration and the variables of corporate, family and government ownership shareholders are used as ownership structure criteria. has been The results show that the increase in ownership concentration leads to a decrease in credit risk and capital adequacy in the bank. Also, government ownership has a negative effect on credit risk, and family and corporate ownership has a positive effect on banks' risk-taking. Also, all three ownership structure variables have a negative effect on bank capital adequacy. In other words, increasing the concentration in all three variables reduces capital adequacy. These findings show that the appropriate ownership structure can limit the bank's risk-taking activities according to the risk level of each bank.
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Keywords
Ownership concentration
ownership structure
capital adequacy
risk-taking
government ownership
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