Returns between companies with information asymmetries based on financing constraints, business strategy and corporate governance

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
mahmoud nozarpour shami 1
Negar Khosravipoor 2
Amir Reza Kyghobadi 3
1 PhD Student, Department of Accounting, Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
2 Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran
3 Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
Information flow is a key parameter in an economic activity and acts as a key factor in the emergence, stability and efficiency of capital markets, the information environment in which investors trade, is constantly changing with the dissemination (flow) of information. The purpose of this study is to investigate the returns between companies with information asymmetry based on financing constraints, business strategy and corporate governance. Also, in order to investigate the subject of the study, after extracting data related to companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange for From 2010 to 1398, the combined data regression model has been used to test the research hypotheses.
According to the research findings, pricing of information asymmetry decreases in conditions of high financial constraint. It is also lower in higher levels of corporate governance. On the other hand, pricing of information asymmetry is higher in levels with bold strategy.
The results show that financial constraints lead to differences in the cost of capital between companies with high information asymmetry and companies with low information asymmetry. Provides because pursuing a market-based and innovative strategy requires investing in several new technologies to design products and explore new markets.
Keywords
Information asymmetry
financial constraints
business strategy
corporate governance
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