The effect of internal information shocks on abnormal accumulated returns

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
Sirvan Azizi 1
Mohammad Reza Vatan parast 2
Mehrdad Sadr Ara 3
farzin Rezaei 4
1 Ph.D. Student in Accounting, Accounting Group, Qazvin Branch, Islamic Azad University, Qazvin, Iran.
2 Assistant Prof Accounting Group, Faculty of Management and Accounting, Rasht Branch, Islamic Azad University, Rasht, Iran.
3 Assistant Prof Economics and Accounting Group, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Guilan, Rasht, Iran.
4 Associate Prof Accounting Group, Faculty of Management and Accounting, Qazvin Branch, Islamic Azad University, Qazvin,Iran.
Abstract
In this paper, considering the signaling theory that corporate managers have more information about the value of the company, they consider the policy of distributing unique profits to transfer information to the market. Accordingly, there is a close relationship between information asymmetry and profit sharing policy. Thus, managers create profit-sharing policies by creating information shocks caused by asymmetry. To achieve the research goal, the data of 90 sample companies were collected in the period 2012-2018 and were analyzed by descriptive-correlation analysis with multiple regression and Wong tests. The findings showed that among the internal information shocks (fundamental changes in the institutional mock-up and fundamental changes in the board of directors), the internal information shocks (fundamental changes in the board of directors) are more related to the policy of profit sharing and accumulated abnormal returns than other variables .
the internal information shocks (fundamental changes in the board of directors) are more related to the policy of profit sharing and accumulated abnormal returns than other variables .
Keywords
Internal Information Shocks
Dividend Policy
accumulated abnormal returns
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