The role of regulatory mechanisms in voluntary disclosure of non-financial information

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
fatemeh ozlati 1
yadoallah noori fard 2
GHodratoallah Emam verdi 3
Roya Darabi 4
Zohreh Hajiha 5
1 Ph.D. student, Department of Accounting, South Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
2 Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, South Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
3 Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran .
4 Associate Professor, Accounting Department, South Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran .
5 Associate Professor, Accounting Department, East Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
One of the requirements for economic growth and development is access to transparent information for all stakeholders. Companies that do not have transparent and acceptable financial reporting are exposed to credit risk and lose shareholder confidence.
Transparency and disclosure of information reduces uncertainty, thereby reducing expected returns and thus cost of capital that can help companies to grow, develop and improve continuously.Disclosure of financial and non-financial information is one of the most important tools for organizations to be held accountable. In addition, corporate executives by fully disclosing information, including voluntary disclosure of non-financial information, can reduce information asymmetry, which is one of the key elements of agency theory.
In this regard, the present study examined the impact of regulatory mechanisms on voluntary disclosure of non-financial information. For this purpose, the data of 102 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during the ten-year period from 2008 to 2016 were used. The results showed that reinforcing regulatory mechanisms increased the voluntary disclosure of non-financial information
Keywords
Non-financial information
voluntary disclosure
regulatory mechanisms
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