Effect of caution and control the sensitivity of Investment to cash flow management

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
Fatemeh Masnabadi Farahani 1
Mehdi Karimi Tabrizi 2
Majid Zanjirdar 3
1 Msc, Faculty of Management, Islamic Azad university, arak (Corresponding Auditor)
2 Instructor, Faculty of Management, Islamic Azad university, arak
3 Associate Prof. Faculty of Management, Islamic Azad university, arak
Abstract
Studies have shown that too much confidence of managers increases the sensitivity of investment in cash and this impact has been significantly higher in companies that have higher agency costs and management control system improves the performance of the company.
The purpose of this study was to determine the relationship between manger’s short-sightedness and the sensitivity of investment in cash. The statistical sample consists of 118 companies in Tehran Stock Exchange during 2010 to 2014 is a total of 590 years. In this study, linear regression was used to examine the hypothesis test and the Eviews software is used to analyze the data and the hypotheses. 
 Based on the regression analysis, and control and caution of managers had high impact on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow and caution and control of managers had also high impact on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow in companies with high investment opportunities.
Keywords
Caution management
Management control
Sensitivity of investment to cash
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