بررسی رابطه بین ارتباطات سیاسی و انعطاف‌پذیری مالی: با استفاده از مدل ظرفیت مازاد بدهی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیارگروه حسابداری، دانشکده علوم اداری اقتصادی ، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد،مشهد، ایران

2 دانشجوی دکتری حسابداری، دانشکده علوم اداری اقتصادی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران

چکیده

مطالعه حاضر به صورت تجربی رابطه بین ارتباطات سیاسی و انعطاف‌پذیری مالی را با استفاده از چهار معیار ارتباطات سیاسی و چهار معیار جهت اندازه‌گیری انعطاف‌پذیری مالی مورد بررسی قرار داده است. نمونه مطالعه حاضر شامل تعداد 142 شرکت عضو بورس اوراق بهادار تهران در فاصله زمانی 1393-1397 و شامل چهار فرضیه بود که رابطه بین ارتباطات سیاسی را با معیارهای انعطاف‌پذیری مالی که عبارت‌اند از ظرفیت مازاد بدهی، نسبت اهرمی، نسبت نقدی و نسبت دارایی‌های ثابت مورد بررسی قرار می‌دهد. جهت تحلیل فرضیه‌های پژوهش از رگرسیون لجستیک و رگرسیون حداقل مربعات معمولی بهره گرفته شد. یافته‌های پژوهش حاکی از آن بود، زمانی که عضو هیئت‌مدیره شرکت‌ها علاوه بر نماینده دولت بودن، از اعضای موظف هیئت‌مدیره باشد، رابطه مثبتی بین ارتباطات سیاسی و انعطاف‌پذیری مالی (ظرفیت مازاد بدهی) وجود دارد. دیگر نتایج مطالعه حاکی از تأثیر منفی ارتباطات سیاسی بر اهرم شرکت‌ها بود. همچنین شواهد کمی در رابطه بین ارتباطات سیاسی و نسبت نقدی شرکت‌ها حاصل شد. درنهایت نتایج نشان داد که با افزایش سطح ارتباطات سیاسی، قابلیت وثیقه گذاری شرکت‌ها کاهش یافته و منجر به افزایش سطح انعطاف‌پذیری مالی شرکت‌ها می‌گردد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Investigating the Relationship between Political Connections and Financial Flexibility: Using spare debt capacity

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mahmoud Lari Dashtbayaz 1
  • zakiyeh marandi 2
1 Associate Professor of Accounting Group, Faculty of Economics and Administrative sciences, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran
2 Phd Student of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Administrative sciences, , Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran.
چکیده [English]

The aim of this study is the investigating the effect of political communication on financial flexibility. The sample of the present study is 142 Tehran Stock Exchange member firms in the period of 2014-2018. The present study included four hypotheses that exploring the relationship between the four criteria of political connections with the criteria of financial flexibility included spare debt capacity, leverage ratio, cash ratio and fixed asset ratio. The results showed when a member of board director in addition to was government agent, he/she was executive member, there was a positive relationship between political connection and financial flexibility (spare debt capacity). Other our result showed that political connection has a negative effect on the firms leverage ratio, also there was not a significance relationship between political connection and the firms cash ratio. Finally, the results showed that as the level of political connection increased, the firms fixed asset ratio decreas and led to an increase in corporate financial flexibility.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Political connection
  • Financial Flexibility
  • spare debt capacity

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