نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری حسابداری ، گروه حسابداری ، واحد قزوین ، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، واحد قزوین ، ایران.
2 استادیارگروه حسابداری، دانشکده مدیریت و حسابداری، واحد رشت، دانشگاه آزاد واحد اسلامی، رشت، ایران.
3 استادیار گروه اقتصاد و حسابداری، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه گیلان ، رشت ،ایران.
4 دانشیار گروه حسابداری، دانشکده مدیریت و حسابداری ، واحد قزوین، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی ، قزوین، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
In this paper, considering the signaling theory that corporate managers have more information about the value of the company, they consider the policy of distributing unique profits to transfer information to the market. Accordingly, there is a close relationship between information asymmetry and profit sharing policy. Thus, managers create profit-sharing policies by creating information shocks caused by asymmetry. To achieve the research goal, the data of 90 sample companies were collected in the period 2012-2018 and were analyzed by descriptive-correlation analysis with multiple regression and Wong tests. The findings showed that among the internal information shocks (fundamental changes in the institutional mock-up and fundamental changes in the board of directors), the internal information shocks (fundamental changes in the board of directors) are more related to the policy of profit sharing and accumulated abnormal returns than other variables .
the internal information shocks (fundamental changes in the board of directors) are more related to the policy of profit sharing and accumulated abnormal returns than other variables .
کلیدواژهها [English]